If we consider that enunciation is a semiosis, its relationship to reality poses a much more difficult problem than the question of reference that we tend to raise as soon as the word "reality" is uttered. In fact, enunciation mobilises the entire formal apparatus of language which, in its very organisation, presupposes a certain division of reality and even, we might add, a belief in the existence of that reality. So there is necessarily a relationship, more or less constrained, between language and supposed reality. The best-known debate has revolved around Aristotle's categories, which the Stagirite saw as one of the essential ways of 'expressing being'. We are familiar with Benveniste's criticism, in which he tried to show that Aristotle, believing he was expressing being, had done nothing more than list the categories of the Greek language. As Benveniste was in turn widely criticised, the categories are still somewhat floating between the meaning conveyed by the language and the being evoked by the philosophers. But there are categories other than those proposed by Aristotle. We can at least mention Kant's and Peirce's categories, some of which are transcendental, others pragmatic. Since we are dealing with enunciation and reality, we would like to take a slightly different route by reflecting on the linguistic position of what is conceived as ultimate truth, beyond being, in the conception proper to the philosophy of Plotinus.