While seemingly straightforward, conceptual analysis faces a philosophical challenge known as the paradox of analysis. This paradox emerges from the tension between two essential conditions that conceptual analyses should meet: (a) expressing necessary identity truths and (b) providing informative statements. Historically associated with thinkers like G.E. Moore, G. Frege, and C. H. Langford, this paradox questions the feasibility of conceptual analysis, as some view the conditions as impossible to satisfy. My aim is to explore such an approach towards this paradox that draws on the intriguing resemblance between real definitions and laws of nature. This resemblance originates from the fundamental purpose shared by both conceptual analysis and laws – that of providing explanations for phenomena. It’s important to note that some argue that while laws offer “why-explanations,” conceptual analysis generally provides “what-explanations,” often referred to as explication. I will argue that one can be rephrased in terms of the other. Therefore, just as “Vixen is the female fox” explains what a vixen is, it also explains why every vixen is female. Likewise, “Water is H2O” serves to explain the nature of water and answers why every sample of water is a liquid with the structure H2O. This parallel highlights the explanatory role shared by both real definitions and laws of nature. Grounded in the seminal works of philosophers like K. Ajdukiewicz, renowned for his discussion on real definitions, the paper posits that the role of such definitions allows us to shed new light on the mentioned paradox.