Scholars concerned with the task of bridge-building between the analytic and the continental traditions often give little attention to the methods they apply to achieve their results. I argue that many procedures used in such studies take the form of the so-called semantic paraphrases. Although paraphrasing has always been present in analytic philosophy (Strawson 1957; Beaney 2000), Ajdukiewicz (1934, 1937), a member of the Lvov-Warsaw School, introduced semantic paraphrases independently. Woleński (1989) and Będkowski (2019) provide a detailed reconstruction of this method. Nowak (1998), a Poznań School of Methodology representative, also developed and applied semantic paraphrasing.This talk explores the idea of paraphrasing as a method of bridge-building between the two traditions. On the one hand, paraphrasing seems to be a productive way of bridge-building between the analytic and the continental traditions, for it helps to understand one in terms of another (and vice versa). On the other, this method is based on certain contestable presuppositions that should be addressed.I examine two cases where I identify the application of such a procedure: Føllesdal’s study on Husserl and Frege (Føllesdal 1972) and Ricoeur’s study on Husserl and Wittgenstein (Ricoeur 1976). My aim is to reconstruct those paraphrases and provide an assessment of their effectiveness. Ajdukiewicz, Woleński, Nowak, and Będkowski provide valuable tools and frameworks for semantic paraphrasing, which I will use to carry out my analysis.