Recent years have seen an increase in interest in a proper definition of lying. A need to account for bald-faced lies have led many to modify a traditional, Augustinian, definition of lying, which requires that the liar has to say something she believes false and has to intend to deceive her hearer. The definition that Prof. Pelc proposed in his paper “On the concept of a lie” is the following:“x is lying whenever he utters a sentence s, to which he ascribes truth value v1, and does so to have the recipient of such utterance mislead, i.e., to have the recipient ascribe to this utterance truth value v2, which is different from v1”.The definition is Augustinian in one sense: it requires that the speaker intends to mislead the hearer. However, there is another aspect that makes it anything but traditional: namely Pelc argues that v1 and v2 may also stand for the lack of truth value. Thus, one may lie if one utters e.g., a statement devoid of truth-value and makes the recipient believe that it has a truth-value. In my talk I’ll try to assess how Pelc’s definition fares against the definitions proposed in current literature.References Pelc, J. On the concept of a lie. Studia Semiotyczne — English Supplement Vol. XVI-XVII (2015)Puczyłowski, Uwagi o kłamstwie i kłamaniu na kanwie pracy Jerzego Pelca O pojęciu kłamstwa – z punktu widzenia semiotyki. Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria R. 27: 2018, 165-184.