The hypothesis behind this meta-study of so-called lifegenres assumes evolutionary connections between basic kinds of animal and human communication. Based on a socio-/bio-semiotic framework (Ongstad, 2019) several meta-studies have already been carried out – of how reference (Ongstad, 2021a, 2022a), spacetime and context (Ongstad, 2022b), and structured form (Ongstad, submitted) constitute animal utterances and hence even zoo-communicational (life-)genres.The framework has four levels, firstly signs (Hoffmeyer, 1997), which further structure utterances (Bakhtin, 1986), which again through routinisation tends to be interpreted as kinds of communication, or genres (Luckmann, 2009). Genres are termed lifegenres when related to animals’ basic lifefunctions (Witzany, 2017). Utterances and life-genres are fourthly experienced and interpreted by a subjective lifeworld (Umwelt) (Husserl, 1936; Uexküll, 1909). Lifeworlds are perceived as generated by communication (Habermas, 1985).Five aspects constitute, simultaneously, both utterances and life-genres: form, content, act, time, and space (Ongstad, 2021b, 2023). Based on the above outlined combined socio- and biosemiotic framework this meta-study inquires how lifegenres serve lifefunctions. Empirical data are extracted from the five above-mentioned zoo-communicational (appr. 20) metastudies, of call-types, types of great-ape communication, and ‘thick-description’ of communication-patterns of well-studied species.Key empirical ‘findings’ (traits) are presented before discussing how they relate to the overall hypothesis asking to which degree this meta-study contributes to the assumed evolutionary connection between basic animal and human kinds (genres) of communication. As the title suggests, discussions will dwell with how life-genres are connected, both to animal life-functions and assumed communicational lifeworlds and thus minds in nature.