As Gramigna put it, «semiotic research on the subject of truth has been scant» (2022). Greimas offered a deflationary account of truth, arguing from Saussure’s autonomy of language thesis that semiotics shall not be interested in truth, but in veridiction (Greimas, Courtés, 1979). Eco (1975), in turn, rejected truth-functionalism as tool for semantics. It seems that truth, or rather its exclusion, could claim to be one of the few places where structuralism and pragmatism happily converge. Yet, it should be possible to distinguish the philosophical problem of truth from the semiotic problem of “truth”, with quotation marks. If interpreted as the representation of the possible meanings of “truth”, the famous veridiction square by Greimas (1989), if one of the few, is not a good semantic representation. Truth is not veridiction, and people may use truth in all steps of the canonical narrative schema, not just in Manipulation. Further, Eco (1984) argued against the independence of language from reality, and Eco (1997, 2) ended up reposing the problem of truth.In the paper I will provide a semantic analysis of “truth” based on insights provided by Eco himself in the second part of his career. I will also be inspired by Sweetser (1987), as I will distinguish between different uses of “truth”: as the opposite of /falsehood/ and /lie/, and as the opposite of /opinion/ and /certainty/, respectively. All in all, the paper suggests that truth is an important field of research for the future of general semiotics.