Peirce’s triadic semiotics has been used as an alternative paradigm to generate non-reductionst, non-dualistic models of human self. The triadic sign is celebrated as a valuable approach to account for the unity of self and for the diversity in human personal identity, without undermining either of the two aspects. In short, Peirce is seen as providing a robust model of self, well-contextualized both socio-psychologically and naturally, while the idea of a “semiotic self” has been cited as a response to the Cartesian “subjective self”. Yet, there are parallel highlights that what Peirce wrote on self is often-times inconsistent and incoherent. A closer look at Peircean literature reveals an interesting bifurcation with regards to the Peircean view on self. On the one hand, there is the claim that Peircean triadic semiotics cannot account for a genuine notion of human self or the “individual I”, this plainly being a part that evaporates in the synechistic whole or continuum. This interpretation aligns with the claim that Peirce seems to have not considered self-consciousness an original and intuitive power. If self-consciousness entails a mediated access to self, then for Peirce self cannot be a phenomenologist pre-cognition. A stream of semioticians have counterargued that such line of reading is a misinterpretation of Peirce on several counts. This paper will explore these double lines of interpretations, while seeking to answer an overarching question: In Peircean semiotics, when precisely does self emerge - Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness?