Many of the categorical pairs used in semiotics to describe our relationship with reality are tricky to handle, as demonstrated by the evolution of the notion of performative vs. efficient ("creates reality" vs. "acts on reality"). Two pairs will be considered: taking vs. taking back, and somatic predicates vs. cognitive predicates. The latter opposes two modes of being thought and enunciated of the real, while the former opposes the experience of perceived bodies and the sign-making of this experience. What the senses perceive is transported into the order of what the mind conceives (language re-produces reality, revives experience): we won't confuse the woman whose breast we see with a discontinuity "like a guizzo", we'll understand Homer differently if we read that the dog Argos "sniffs out" Ulysses or that he "recognizes" him. In this way, I can express my experience as a Subject assuming the point of view of logos, or take the stance of the non-Subject, on the side of phusis: two movements of distance to be considered, that which leads "from the sensible world" to its "intelligible lining" (the Dutch painters according to Lévi-Strauss) and that which aims to (re) find as closely as possible, with the means proper to logos, the perceived of the body, the phusis (difference "Loquor corpus" / "Loquor de corpore"), of which only enunciation, within the exchange, allows presentification.